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The historic ‘great transformations’ in economy, society and polity that have followed major 
financial crises (Blyth, 2002, Gamble, 2009), have generally been protracted multiphase 
processes that have taken well over a decade to unfold (Helleiner, 2010, Blyth, 2002)
2
. Based 
on this historical track record, it is undoubtedly premature to attempt to reach a verdict on the 
overall impact and significance of the financial crash of 2007-09, in terms of a new or future 
political economy. However, it is not too early to seek to identify interesting or new emerging 
patterns, and to consider their potential significance and importance.  
     What we discover of course depends on where we look. If we look in the obvious places, - 
public and party political discourses in western Europe and North America on the 
macroeconomy (including the pronouncements of the IMF, OECD and European Central 
Bank,) it is a familiar tale. We discover a crisis couched in terms of excessive public debt, a 
problem of ‘crowding out,’ a recurrence of stagflation, with the intellectual ascendancy of 
rational expectations and Ricardian equivalence seemingly firmly entrenched (Blyth and 
Shenai 2010, ECB, 2010). If we look in some less obvious places, a rather more interesting 
picture begins to emerge.   
         One of the more intriguing patterns to emerge following the peak of the financial 
distress of 2008 is the sudden rise to prominence of macroprudential ideas in regulatory 
policy communities. Many scholars of financial governance think of technocratic networks of 
financial regulators as representing orthodox, conservative, incremental forms of governance 
displaying symptoms of path dependence, ideational inertia and cognitive locking (Porter, 
2003, Baker, 2009, Tsingou, 2009, Moschella, 2011, Mugge, 2011, Germain, 2010, 
Underhill, 1995). Yet from late 2008 onwards, in the space of just over six months, those 
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financial regulatory networks centred around the Swiss city of Basel, presided over a 
startlingly rapid ideational shift, the significance and importance of which remains to be 
deciphered. From being relatively unpopular and very much on the sidelines, the idea of 
macroprudential regulation (MPR) moved to the centre of the policy agenda and became the 
principal interpretative frame, for financial technocrats and regulators seeking to navigate the 
crisis and respond to it, not only in terms of diagnosing and understanding it, but also in 
advancing institutional blue prints for regulatory reform (Blyth, 2002). This article sets out to 
explain how and why that ideational shift occurred before making some arguments about its 
potential significance in terms of ushering in a new political economy of macroprudential 
regulation (MPR).  
            While on the face of things, macroprudential ideas appear to be quite narrow, arid and 
technocratic, they also have a normative element, with potentially profound long term 
consequences. In particular, macroprudential ideas challenge and reject efficient market 
theories, and advance a quite different conception of market relations and behaviour. Such a 
conception of markets implies a redefinition of the role of public authorities and an increase 
in their power to intervene and set limits to financial market activities. It is also a position 
that in some guises implies a reduction in levels of permitted financial activity on the grounds 
that such activities can be socially damaging. In this respect, the rise to prominence of MPR 
will provide a perfect live laboratory for constructivist political economy scholars interested 
in examining the politically transformative affects of economic ideas and their capacity to 
reconfigure social and political relations in financialized economies over the next decade, or 
more.  
     The rest of the article proceeds in three principal steps. First, a short intellectual history 
and genealogy of MPR is provided. Second, an explanation and account of why there was 
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little enthusiasm for MPR prior to the crisis and how and why this changed during the crisis, 
is developed. This explanation draws on agent centred constructivist scholarship and rests on 
the argument that crises, as moments of uncertainty, have to be endogenously constructed 
through the use of economic arguments and interpretative frames (Widmaier, Blyth and 
Seabrooke, 2007). In the field of financial regulation, MPR, became the dominant frame of 
interpretation, due to the apparent breakdown of some of the key premises of the previous 
efficient markets orthodoxy, but also due to the activities of a small number of norm 
entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998,) who formed a coalition across linked 
‘professional ecologies’ (Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009). While constructivist scholarship has 
drawn attention to the act of persuasion, it has to date, paid insufficient attention to the scope 
or enabling conditions that determine how and why ideas are selected in periods of crisis 
(Chwieroth, 2010). Chwieroth’s recent study of Indonesia identified four such conditions (the 
four Cs), but the dynamics of crisis politics at work in the case of a developing country, are 
likely to differ from those evident in international and transnational regulatory networks and 
their relationship to leading core developed states, as considered here. This article specifies 
four scope conditions (the four Ps) that shaped the emergence of MPR as the principal post 
crisis regulatory interpretative frame. These include: P1 = presence - the prior intellectual and 
institutional presence of ideas; P2 = professional positioning – advocates of ideas becoming 
better positioned in professional policy networks; P3 = promotion and persuasion - individual 
insiders (norm entrepreneurs) willingly engaging in networking and persuasion strategies, 
actively promoting ideas when the opportunity arose; and P4= plausibility – a seeming 
increase in the explanatory capacity of those ideas based on their diagnosis of the situation 
and their advocacy of a feasible programme of action that could be accepted by a range of 
relevant actors, together with the rising professional esteem, status and standing  of the 
advocates of those ideas, based on their prior analytical performance, which increased the 
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plausibility, both of them as individuals and the ideas they were advocating. Third, the 
implications and significance of this spate of norm entrepreneurial activity are briefly 
assessed in the final section of the article, by considering the macroprudential ideational shift 
in the terms of Peter Hall’s concept of a paradigm shift (Hall, 1993). It is argued that the 
sequencing identified by Hall in the case of British macroeconomic policy in the 1970s, is 
reversed in the case of the macroprudential ideational shift, with highly contingent and 
uncertain consequences.  
            
Macroprudential Regulation: A short intellectual history 
Macroprudential is a relatively recent term, with a longer intellectual history. The term was 
first used at a meeting of the Cooke Committee, (a forerunner of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision BCBS), on 28-29 June 1979, to refer to how problems associated with a 
particular institution could have destabilising systemic financial implications (Clement, 
2010). It was however, a further seven years before the term macroprudential first made it 
into a public document. In 1986, a Bank for International Settlements (BIS) report defined 
macroprudential policy as, policy that promotes the safety and soundness of the broad 
financial system and payments mechanism (BIS, 1986, p.2). Despite some informal usage of 
the term ‘macroprudential’ at the BIS after 1986, it was following the Asian financial crisis 
during the early 2000s, that more substance was added to macroprudential concepts through a 
spate of intellectual and research activity
3
. The BIS Research Department was a key location 
for this work, although a number of academic and private sector economists such as Martin 
Hellwig, Avinash Persaud, Charles Goodhart and development economists such as Jose 
Ocampo and Stephanie Griffith-Jones, also made important contributions to key 
macroprudential concepts including fallacy of composition, herding and procyclicality.  
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       In 2000, Andrew Crockett, General Manager of the BIS, contrasted macroprudential with 
microprudential approaches. The focus in macroprudential approaches, according to Crockett, 
was on the financial system as a whole, so as to limit the costs of financial distress in terms of 
macroeconomic output. This was accompanied by an acknowledgement that aggregate risk 
was endogenous, or dependent on the collective rather than individual behaviour of financial 
institutions. Consequently, while an institution’s actions could appear individually rational, in 
the aggregate that behaviour could generate undesirable outcomes for the system as a whole 
(Crockett, 2000). A key macroprudential concept therefore is the Keynesian notion of a 
fallacy of composition, or the idea that it is aggregate or collective systemic outcomes that 
matter rather than just individual incentives and courses of action. From a macroprudential 
perspective therefore striving to make individual institutions safe (a microprudential 
approach
4
) does not necessarily make the system as a whole safe, because diversification at 
an institutional level does not necessarily produce system wide diversity (Haldane, 2010). 
Such arguments essentially critiqued the exclusively microprudential approach, which 
involved home country regulators supervising individual institutions but not jurisdictions or 
systems in their entirety (Persaud, 2010). Consequently, the macroprudential perspective 
argues that regulators needed to take a system wide view and implement top down 
requirements – a macro approach. Three further macroprudential concepts, - procyclicality, 
herding and externalities, - follow on from this notion of a fallacy of composition. 
       First, Claudio Borio, William White and other BIS officials, examined how risk evolved 
over time with reference to the credit cycle, identifying the inherent ‘procyclicality’ of the 
financial system, or a tendency for lending and transacting to inflate asset prices and create 
financial booms (Borio, Furfine and Lowe, 2001, Borio and White, 2004, White, 2006, BIS 
2006). Procyclicality refers to how during the up phase of a cycle, as asset prices rise, 
measured risk appears to fall. It is a concept therefore, that draws directly on Minsky’s 
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observation that the system appears safest precisely when it is at its most vulnerable. In such 
circumstances, competitive pressures to increase profits, cause banks to increase their 
leverage, and invest in rising asset classes, or suffer falling stock prices
5
. Views about 
acceptable debt structure change. Debt financing further inflates asset prices, creating easy 
credit and a speculative and unsustainable investment led boom (Minsky, 1977, pp.65-66). In 
contrast when asset prices start to fall, risk appears to rise, selling of assets commences, 
views on acceptable levels of debt are revised downwards and uncertainty grips markets, 
causing available credit to contract. The procyclical paradox of credit therefore is that it is 
most available when it is least needed and least available when it is most needed. To 
counteract the inherent procyclical tendencies of financial markets, the BIS argued that 
regulatory policy had to be countercyclical, - a policy framework that induced institutions to 
build up capital cushions or buffers in good times, so that they could be drawn down in bad 
times, thereby stabilizing and modifying the worst excesses of procyclicality by imposing 
constraints on private market actors during the upswing phase of a cycle, through the 
application of a dragging anchor (Borio and Drehman, 2008)
6
.  
       Second, academic work illuminated how diversification by individual institutions could 
result in their balance sheets and portfolios becoming increasingly similar, thereby increasing 
non-diversifiable systemic risk (Hellwig, 1995). Such a point was elaborated by Avinash 
Persuad, when he observed that large banks’ risk assessment models bore close resemblance 
to one another. These ‘value at risk’ models (VaR), operated through daily price sensitive risk 
limits that required banks to reduce exposure when the probability of losses increased as a 
result of falling asset prices. This in turn meant that many banks tended to hit their VaR 
determined risk limits simultaneously and therefore had to sell the same assets at the same 
time resulting in financial herding and plummeting asset prices further accentuating 
procyclicality (Persaud, 2000). Consequently, banks reliance on VaR models and market 
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prices for the management of risk, as encouraged by the Basel II agreement, actually 
encouraged market participants to herd into areas that appeared safe, as measured risk 
appeared to fall in the build up to the boom, but then rose with a vengeance during the bust 
(Persaud, 2009).  
      Third, is what BIS economists refer to as the cross sectional dimension, or the linkages 
between markets and market participants that generate externalities and unanticipated 
consequences (Borio, 2009). The basic proposition raised by the pioneering work of Andrew 
Haldane at the Bank of England, is that financial engineering, shadow banking and 
securitization, rather than making the financial system safer, have often increased instability 
due to the complex externalities that have proliferated. This means that relatively small 
unexpected events can generate increasingly costly explosions that no model of political 
economy can sustain indefinitely (Haldane, 2010, Alessandri and Haldane, 2009, Taleb and 
Blyth, 2011). At the same time, excessive complexity has exceeded the capacity of human 
cognition, making risk incalculable (Best, 2010, Haldane, 2010, Turner, 2011, Blyth, 2011).  
In developing these ideas Haldane has worked with epidemiologists, physicists and a 
professor of zoology to develop network modelling and systems analysis. An important 
argument arising from this research is that as financial systems are less modularised, less self 
contained and more integrated they display many of the symptoms of complex ecosystems. 
While a simple ecosystem can accommodate bigger shocks, because the various parts of it are 
relatively self contained and do not generate unexpected chain reactions, relatively small 
changes in a complex ecosystem generate dislocation, precisely because of the chain 
reactions that do unfold (Haldane and May, 2011). According to this type of analysis, such 
developments have made the financial system more prone to systemic collapse, with 
catastrophic consequences in terms of lost macroeconomic output. Analysis of this kind 
provides a powerful rationale to move the perimeter of regulation to cover shadow banking, 
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but also to modularise or separate financial activities, through Glass-Stegall type legislation, 
to tax and even prohibit certain financial activities and transactions, because their social costs 
may exceed any economic value they generate (Haldane, 2010, Turner, 2011, Tucker, 2010.) 
       In short, macroprudential thinking challenges the analytical foundations of the previous 
efficient markets orthodoxy that dominated the pre crisis period. The ‘trilogy’ that was at the 
heart of the ‘old Basel consensus’ (Eatwell, 2009), that greater transparency, more disclosure 
and more effective risk management by financial firms based on market prices are all that is 
required for the regulation of efficient markets, and that securitization and financial 
innovation necessarily make the financial system safer, are all questioned by core 
macroprudential concepts (see table 1). Indeed, it was the very risk management strategies, 
derived from this trilogy and endorsed by Basel II, that MPR advocates claimed, ‘hardwired’ 
procyclicality into the financial system (FSA, 2009, Claessens, Underhill and Zhang, 2008). 
Macroprudential regulation can therefore be conceived of as a series of premises that refute 
the old Basel `consensus, and seek to forge a new Basel consensus that emphasises 
procyclicality, externalities, herding and the dangers of overly complex financial systems (see 
table 1, Helleiner, 2010).        
TABLE 1 HERE 
          To summarise, MPR’s ultimate contribution is to spotlight the volatile and inherently 
unstable nature of contemporary financial systems. In this regard MPR has a mixed 
intellectual heritage.  One former BIS MPR pioneer has made an appeal to Austrian school 
influences, assigning critical importance to the excessive creation of money and credit
7
. 
However, the same individual also acknowledges the diverse and eclectic intellectual 
genealogy of MPR ideas by pinpointing the Keynes’ inspired work of Hyman Minsky. 
Indeed, the principal intellectual challenge, according to William White, is to blend Minsky’s 
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Keynesian framework with insights from the Austrian School (White, 2009, p.17). In this 
respect, the crucial underpinning for MPR ideas draws heavily on Hyman Minsky’s financial 
instability hypothesis, including the observation that risks are born in periods of stability 
(Minsky, 1977), and the observation that financial markets are prone to myopia, irrational 
exuberance, herd behaviour and subjectivities that are prone to change (Turner 2011, Tucker 
2011). Crucially, macroprudential concepts refute not only the efficient markets position, but 
also the rational expectations foundations of both new classical and new Keynesian 
perspectives (White, 2009). The significance of this change in underlying assumptions can be 
understood through a key passage from Minsky. 
We have to examine economic processes that go forward in time, which means 
that investment, the ownership of capital assets, and the accompanying 
financial activity become the central concerns of the theorizing. Once this is 
done then instability can be shown to be a normal result of the economic 
process. Once instability is understood as a theoretical possibility, then we are 
in a position to design appropriate interventions to constrain it (Minsky, 1982, 
p.xii.)  
Because macroprudential ideas do exactly this, and consider financial instability to be not 
only possible, but also endemic and endogenous to the system, they also create the case for a 
far more extensive series of public interventions in financial markets. MPR’s putative 
analytical shift prepares the ground for a reassertion of public authority over private interest, 
and involves a normative stance that regulation should be driven by a desire to ensure that the 
costs to society as a whole are less than the private costs incurred by private sector 
institutions (Persaud, 2009, Alessandri and Haldane, 2009, Turner, 2011). In this respect, in 
contrast to the efficient markets derived modern risk management paradigm of 
microprudential supervision, that has prevailed over the last two or three decades, and which 
has essentially involved regulators asking banks what they do (Tsingou, 2008), MPR implies 
a return to regulators telling banks what they should do
8
. This is important because it 
potentially involves an important reconstitution of power relations at the heart of 
 10 
 
financialized capitalism, together with lower levels of financialization, with all of its 
attendant implications for social settlements in Anglo-American societies (Turner, 2011, Hay, 
2011). That is deserving of further attention and exploration by scholars in the field of 
political economy over the next decade, particularly those interested in the power and 
transformative effects of economic ideas.  
 
The Political Economy of an Ideational Shift 
“We are all Macroprudentialists now.” Claudio Borio, Director of Research, Bank for 
International Settlements, November 2009. 
This modern risk management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual 
edifice however collapsed in the summer of last year.” Former Federal Reserve Chairman, 
Alan Greenspan, evidence to the US House of Representatives, 23
rd
 October 2008. 
Claudio Borio’s comments above neatly summarise how macroprudential ideas have moved 
from relative obscurity in certain enclaves of the BIS, to the centre of the policy agenda, 
dominating and driving the post crisis financial reform debate, in the international community 
of central bankers. While the macroprudential perspective slowly gained ground due to the 
analytical work conducted by the BIS during the first half of the last decade, as covered in the 
previous section, it was, according to Borio, ‘the recent financial crisis that gave it an 
extraordinary boost’ (Borio, 2009, p.32). As Borio has pointed out, ‘a decade ago the term 
macroprudential was barely used and there was little appetite amongst policy makers and 
regulators to even engage with the concept, let alone strengthen macroprudential regulation’ 
(Borio, 2009, p.32). For example, in several well documented exchanges at the Jackson Hole, 
Conference of the Kansas City Federal Reserve in 2003 and at later meetings of central 
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bankers at the BIS headquarters in Basel, Alan Greenspan was notoriously dismissive of the 
macroprudential analysis and arguments of both Borio and William White, who were 
warning of the dangers of an inflating financial boom. Other central bankers at these 
meetings largely agreed with Greenspan (Balzil and Schiessl, 2009).  Despite receiving 
backing from sections of the BIS therefore, MPR remained relatively unpopular in the lead 
up to the crisis of 2007-09. From late 2008 through to mid 2009 however the popularity of 
MPR surged and its constituent ideas permeated key institutional settings in the global 
financial architecture, with both the BCBS and the new Financial Stability Board (FSB) being 
given macroprudential mandates by the  G20 (FSB, 2009).  
          Scholarship has been quick to point out how financial crises and subsequent responses 
are multiphase processes (Helleiner, 2010, Chwieroth, 2010, Blyth, 2002). From late 2008 
through to 2009, policy makers engaged in a period of diagnosis and reflection involving the 
establishment of reform agendas and priorities. When it comes to understanding the role ideas 
play in periods of financial crisis sequencing is all important (Blyth, 2002, p.44). As Blyth 
has pointed out, before agents can respond to a crisis they have to have some idea what 
caused it and ideas in this context can act to reduce the ‘Knightian’ uncertainty that 
accompanies unique events, by providing a diagnosis of those events. In many respects, this 
period represented a period of exceptional crisis politics, during which routine calculations of 
interest became upset by dramatic events, with macroprudential ideas providing an 
explanation of a confusing situation that also reconfigured perceptions of interest and allowed 
agents to redefine their understanding of their relationship to the crisis (Polsky, 2000, Blyth, 
2002, p.38). During this period MPR became established as a normative and political priority, 
not only amongst the leaders and ministers of the G20, but also became diffused and 
established in the work programmes of the more technical committees of the BCBS, the FSB, 
the BIS, national central banks and even public-private policy communities consisting of 
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major industry representatives such as the G30. To understand how this process unfolded 
however, we need to identify the scoping or enabling conditions that determined the process 
of ideational selection. But first, it is necessary to ask why macroprudential ideas were 
relatively unpopular prior to the crisis?  
 
Why was macroprudential regulation relatively unpopular prior to the crisis?    
The obvious answer to this question is that MPR ran contrary to the identifiable material 
interests of major players, at least during a financial boom. For example, during the boom, 
the two leading financial centres and pioneers of financial innovation and shadow banking, 
London and New York, provided the US and UK, as current account debtor states, with the 
means of financing deficits through capital account surpluses (Blyth, 2003, Baker, 2006). 
Neither government had much in the way of an immediately identifiable material incentive to 
slow the inflow of capital into their financial systems, or to place restrictions on the activities 
of their own institutions. Significant financial rents accrued to the governments of the US and 
UK courtesy of their financial sectors (25% of tax revenues in the case of the UK). 
Financialization and securitization were also integral to the growth models and welfare 
settlements of the US and the UK (Langley, 2008, Seabrooke, 2006, Finlayson, 2009).  Light 
touch regulation in the UK, and a different but similarly market oriented approach in the 
United States, were both a cause and a consequence of financialized political economies 
(Johnson and Kwak, 2010, Baker, 2010). Macroprudential arguments that an unsustainable 
boom was inflating were also unattractive to incumbent politicians who were concerned that 
booms would continue until well after elections had been successfully contested (Warwick 
Commission, 2009). Electorates enjoying the prosperity of a boom were similarly disinclined 
to hear arguments about instability and unsustainability. Reinforcing this pattern of state 
interests were private sector interests that strongly favoured the exclusively microprudential 
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emphasis on VaR models of the Basel II agreement (Underhill and Zhang, 2008). Empirical 
research for example, reveals that the Institute of International Finance, an umbrella 
organization, comprised of many of the world’s largest banks, consistently shaped the Basel 
II policy script, making its VaR focus, a deliberate result of private sector design and 
preference expression (Tsingou, 2008).  A coalition of leading states and powerful private 
interests were therefore largely aligned against macroprudential regulation during the boom. 
       A focus on calculations of material interest only provides a partial explanation for 
opposition to MPR, however. Another factor was a form of intellectual or cognitive capture 
(Johnson and Kwak, 2010, Baker, 2010, Buiter, 2009). The conventional pre crisis wisdom 
shared by regulators, central banks and the risk management departments of large banks 
rested on a simplified version of efficient market theories, that were antithetical to, and 
rejected the case, or need for, MPR. For example, the assumption that financial markets were 
rational and tended towards equilibrium were not just accepted at the UK’s Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) prior to the crisis, but had, according to the current head of the 
institution, ‘become part of the institutional DNA’ (Turner, 2011).  In this context, MPR 
appeared an unnecessarily cautious and costly set of proposals.  
          A further factor was the standing and position of dominant charismatic individuals in 
central bank networks.  The obvious example is Greenspan’s status as ‘the maestro’ 
(Woodward, 2000). Greenspan had presided over a record period of low inflationary growth, 
- ‘the great moderation’, and his standing amongst central bank peers effectively gave him a 
power of veto in international financial governance during the boom, which was not just a 
function of office, but also of his social status on the basis of his track record. His opposition 
to MPR and support for the modern risk management paradigm, has been well recorded, as 
observed at the beginning of this section, and in the face of opposition from Greenspan, MPR 
stood little chance of gaining ground in central bank networks.  
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       Finally, MPR advocates located at the BIS, did indeed forward macroprudential informed 
analysis but their arguments made little headway, partly for the reasons and context outlined 
above, but also because they lacked strategic capacity. As William White, himself has 
conceded, “we were staff. All we could do was present our expertise. It was not within our 
power how it was used (Balzil and Schiessl, 2009).” In other words, the presence of argument 
and analysis alone was insufficient. It needed to be accompanied by strategy (promotion), by 
strategic professional position and by a sympathetic wider prevailing context (plausibility). 
These enabling conditions were absent prior to the crisis and BIS staff found themselves 
isolated in their promotion of MPR.   
 
Scoping Condition P1 = Prior Intellectual and Institutional Presence   
During 2008, as we moved towards the height of the crisis, the existing efficient markets 
orthodoxy - a ‘do little’ position remained ascendant in technocratic networks. Indeed, the 
initial early centre piece international policy document of the crisis, - a report by the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF 2008), which set out an agenda for responding to early 
liquidity problems and stress in securities and derivatives markets, re-iterated ‘the familiar 
trilogy’ (Eatwell, 2009). The core message in this report was that greater transparency, more 
disclosure and more effective risk management by banks and investment funds were the best 
market enhancing light touch response (FSF, 2008). The inadequacy of this thinking became 
clear when, the sheer number of financial institutions requiring public financial support 
following the collapse of Lehmans in the Autumn of 2008, meant that financial distress took 
on a systemic quality. The extreme downward movement in a number of interrelated asset 
classes could not be explained by the efficient markets approach. From this perspective 
systematic mistakes by markets (as the sum of individual rational decisions), as opposed to 
isolated random ones, could not happen, at least when adequate information was available, 
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because optimising agents would drive prices into equilibrium. In contrast, the 
macroprudential approach that emphasised the importance of systemic thinking and 
highlighted the procyclical and unstable tendencies of financial markets, provided a ready 
made conceptual apparatus for explaining the events of Autumn 2008. This conceptual 
approach also critiqued the dominance of the existing orthodox and its overreliance on VaR 
models, asserting that such an approach was a cause of the crisis, that had further ‘hard 
wired’ procyclicality into the financial system (FSA, 2009). In this context, the existing 
orthodoxy became part of the problem that had to be replaced with new thinking.  
    Crucially, as the first section of this paper revealed, MPR had in the words of Claudio 
Borio, been ‘evolving quietly in the background, known only amongst a small but growing 
inner circle of cognoscenti’ (Borio, 2011, p.1). In other words macroprudential ideas had a 
prior intellectual and institutional presence, particularly at the BIS. This meant MPR 
advocates had the strategic advantage of access to the established financial technocratic 
research and report writing machinery that politicians called upon to provide them with 
diagnoses, answers and proposals. This was not true of the radical market fundamentalist 
perspective that attributed the crisis to excessive government intervention and argued for less 
intervention by central banks (Henderson, 2008), or equally radical calls for wholesale 
nationalizations of financial sectors and immediate prohibition of many market activities   As 
Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods have pointed out, “successful [regulatory] change is made 
more likely where new ideas provide a way to regulate that both offers a common ground to a 
coalition of entrepreneurs pressing for change and fits well with not-discredited existing 
institutions.” (Mattli and Woods, 2009, pp.4-5). In this respect, MPR had not discredited 
institutional and individual backers that were already linked into key policy making networks 
in the form of Borio’s inner circle of cognoscenti. As Tony Porter has pointed out if 
proposals in the field of financial governance are to appear viable to policy makers, they have 
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to be grounded in prior research, technical reports and have an institutional presence (Porter, 
2003). Following the financial implosion of 2008, macroprudential advocates were not 
starting from scratch. Individuals such as Borio and White, were already recognised and 
positioned within key policy networks, with a prior track record of advancing 
macroprudential ideas for nearly decade. Scoping condition P1 therefore is prior institutional 
and intellectual presence, which gave the macroprudential perspective an advantage in terms 
of institutional access and a body of prior work that outlined the inadequacies of the prior 
efficient markets orthodoxy. 
 
P2=Professional Position 
Writing in 2009, Claudio Borio of the BIS noted that, “this swell of support [for 
macroprudential regulation] could not have been anticipated even as recently as a couple of 
years ago. The current financial crisis has been instrumental in underpinning it” (Borio, 2009, 
p.2). The groundswell of support for macroprudential regulation occurred from late 2008 
onwards. Despite the prior institutional presence of MPR, BIS staff had limited capacity to 
push their ideas during the boom, precisely because too many other professional groups 
within the policy location of international monetary and financial monetary governance were 
not inclined to listen. In this respect, Len Seabrooke and Eleni Tsingou, drawing on the work 
of sociologist Andrew Abbott, have usefully identified three linked professional ecologies in 
the area of monetary and financial governance that help us to identify and explain the 
difficulties facing BIS staff (Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009). These include financial and 
monetary systems (FMS) – those concerned with monetary and regulatory policy, (in this 
case primarily the staff of central banks and national regulators); professional economic 
sciences (PES) (economists developing economic theories, models and analysis and data 
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sets); and asset trading and evaluation (ATE) banks, investment firms and rating agencies 
engaged in risk management and credit provision. Seabrooke and Tsingou’s contention is that 
policy proposals need a support base that spans all three professional ecologies if they are to 
be successful (Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009). The evidence from the macroprudential case 
provides support for this contention. 
      Locating BIS research economists such as White and Borio in relation to these linked 
professional ecologies is difficult. They effectively operate as a free standing pool of 
expertise, research and analysis that can be availed of, or ignored, by the central banks, but 
they have no formal decision making role, or function within the regulatory and policy 
making community, other than the provision of advice, analysis and arguments. BIS staff, 
therefore, display many of the professional traits of professional economic sciences (PES). 
Other prominent MPR advocates such as Charles Goodhart, Jose Ocampo, Stephany Griffith 
Jones, John Eatwell and Martin Hellwig, were also largely drawn from professional economic 
sciences. National policy makers in contrast were less concerned with intellectual cases and 
hypothetical constructions, but were primarily events driven, focused on immediate and 
medium term policy success, - seemingly evident throughout the boom in the form of growth, 
low inflation (according to the measures,) and the appearance of relative financial stability in 
leading economies. They had little incentive or inclination to listen to alternative analyses 
questioning their policy model and track record, because there appeared to be no immediate 
empirical disconfirmation of their assumptions, or methods. During the boom MPR, 
advocates were consequently largely regarded as prophets of doom, at many G7 central 
banks, with William White, being openly and ironically derided at the Federal Reserve as 
‘Merry Sunshine’ (Balzil and Schissel, 2009). Without a substantial foothold in this day to 
day national policy practitioner community, macroprudential ideas stood little chance of 
gaining ground. Tellingly, the verdict of current BIS Secretary General Peter Dittus on the 
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BIS staff record during the boom was that they had the right analysis, but did not know how 
to use it and present it (Balzil and Schiessl, 2009). In short, macroprudential advocates may 
have had good ideas and arguments, but they were not in a position to promote them in an 
effective fashion, nor could they make their ideas appeal to the priorities, concerns and 
functional skill sets of a sufficiently broad coalition of other professional actors. In terms of 
the intertwined and overlapping professional ecologies of the financial world, MPR advocates 
were marginalised prior to the crisis and largely confined to a relatively small group within 
professional economic science.  
         Crucially, post crisis MPR advocates were able to make connections across the different 
professions that characterise the domain of financial governance, mainly due to a 
combination of circumstance and opportunity. In particular, MPR advocates were able to 
present practical policy proposals that promised to limit future potential market losses, to 
reduce future calls on public finances and to minimise the loss to macroeconomic output that 
came with episodes of financial distress. This increased the appeal of these ideas to both 
public and private sector representatives. Macroprudential policy instruments such as counter 
cyclical capital buffers for example, could be presented as a long term insurance mechanism 
to both public and private actors. Spain was frequently held up by macroprudential advocates 
as an example of a country whose banks had emerged strongly from the events of 2008, 
despite a huge real estate crisis, largely because of the presence of counter cyclical capital 
buffers (Eatwell, 2009, Persaud, 2009, Borio and Drehman, 2008, FSA, 2009). Furthermore, 
the emergence of the G20 as the premier steering committee in the global economy (Cooper, 
2010), and the move to expand membership of a number of technical committees such as the 
BCBS and the new FSB, meant that Asian countries such as India and South Korea, who had 
pioneered the use of a number of macroprudential policy instruments such as leverage limits 
and value to loan ratios, without naming them as such (Borio, 2011), offered up further 
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practical examples of how macroprudential policy had helped these states escape the worst 
effects of the financial distress of 2008. Macroprudential proposals thus moved out of a 
purely conceptual and intellectual realm, and quickly developed real practical applications 
and lessons that could be drawn upon by both professionals across public and private sectors. 
The consequence of this was that, a situation of relative professional isolation was 
transformed, due to the emergence of a broader coalition that spanned the linked ecologies of 
financial governance and was attracted to macroprudential thinking as both a diagnosis of 
events, but also as a series of prescriptions with practical applications
9
.  Scoping condition P2 
that provided the basis for the success of macropruential ideas was an improvement in 
professional positioning and appeal. 
 
P3=Promotion and persuasion         
While, the improved position of macroprudential ideas within professional networks was an 
eventual outcome of the crisis, it doesn’t tell us about the process through which that outcome 
was achieved. In terms of crisis politics a third condition, - the willingness of 
macroprudential norm entrepreneurs to engage in the very action of promotion and 
persuasion as P3, is particularly crucial. During the crisis, policy makers and politicians 
began a frantic search for alternatives to the simplified efficient market orthodoxy, to explain 
the situation they found themselves in and to provide a template for affirmative action 
(Persaud, 2009). The literature on norm emergence holds that stage one in this process is the 
act of persuasion by norm entrepreneurs as experts who use language to name, interpret and 
give meaning to events and issues, resulting in a renaming or framing process that shapes 
how issues and events are understood and talked about (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). 
During 2008 and 2009, MPR became the central framing device for understanding and 
interpreting the financial crash and how to respond, but this only came about due to a 
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proactive promotional and persuasive strategy by a relatively small number of key 
macroprudential norm entrepreneurs. In other words, the rise to prominence of 
macroprudential ideas relied upon norm entrepreneurs who were willing to take action and 
engage in a public process of diagnosis, persuasion and prescription. Two elements of their 
strategy were particularly important. First macroprudential norm entrepreneurs became much 
better at engaging with and selling their ideas to national policy makers in the post crisis 
period. Second, macroprudential norm entrepreneurs were very adept at positioning 
themselves on many of the key post crisis committees that produced key set piece reports on 
the crisis, ensuring their ideas featured in the resulting proposals.   
         For example, in the UK, a triumvirate of advisors – economists John Eatwell, Charles 
Goodhart and Avinash Persaud from the investment community, converted Adair Turner, the 
new head regulator of the FSA, to the macroprudential cause in briefings during the summer 
of 2008. Turner became one of the most forceful and eloquent advocates of the 
macroprudential position and began to make the macroprudential case at the meetings of the 
FSF in Basel
10
. As the FSF prepared reports for G20 meetings, macroprudential references 
and thinking also began to find their way into G20 communiques, albeit somewhat cryptically 
under the heading ‘mitigating procyclicality’ with support expressed for countercyclical 
capital buffers, for the first time in the Horsham communiqué of 2009 (G20, 2009). Turner 
and his team also made the case to Treasury, Bank of England and Cabinet Office officials.  
Persaud briefed HM Treasury officials as he sat on several Treasury boards. On another 
occasion Eatwell forcibly made the case for MPR to Treasury, Bank of England and Cabinet 
Office officials at a briefing session/ discussion ahead of UK preparations for the London 
G20 Summit (Eatwell, 2009)
11
.  
       Meanwhile, William White had now retired from the BIS, but was in demand as one of 
the few prescient voices prior to the crisis. He was consequently advising and briefing the 
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German G20 team and also briefing Canadian officials using the frame of MPR analysis, to a 
receptive audience given Canada already had limits on bank leverage (Balzil and Schissel, 
2009). The increased access to the levers of national state policy making that macroprudential 
advocates enjoyed in Euro zone states, the UK and Canada, enabled the outlines of a 
macroprudential consensus to be built through the G20 and the FSB. By the summer of 2009 
the new FSB was calling on the BCBS to commence work on countercyclical capital buffers, 
and a new Basel III agreement with a macroprudential component was eventually announced 
in the second half of 2010. 
            At the same London meeting, in which Eatwell made the MPR case in 2009, a senior 
British official argued that the reason Spanish Banks had remained strong, despite a massive 
real estate crisis, was nothing to do with dynamic provisioning, or the counter cyclical capital 
buffers they employed. It was because they got lucky
12
. In other words, resistance from 
sceptical voices advocating the prior other orthodoxy, meant that MPR advocates still had an 
argument to win during 2009. A key element of macroprudential norm entrepreneurs’ 
promotional strategy was however crucial in overcoming such opposition. 
Macroprudentialists positioned themselves in a number of key committees that produced key 
set piece policy reports on the crisis, in such a way that now it was the efficient markets 
orthodoxy that found itself increasingly isolated, as the search for alternatives to the prior 
orthodoxy commenced.  In the UK, the FSA’s principal document, The Turner Review, 
diagnosed and set out an action plan for responding to the crisis, within a macroprudential 
frame (FSA, 2009). Persaud and Goodhart also teamed up with Andrew Crockett, former BIS 
director general and long time of advocate of MPR to publish the Geneva Report into the 
crisis in July 2009, which again made the case for MPR (Brunnermeir et al, 2009). Through 
his participation in the UN Stiglitz Commission, Persaud also ensured MPR featured in their 
recommendations (UN, 2009). The De Laroisiere report produced by the EU also identified 
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the need for a macroprudential approach (De Laroisiere 2009). G30 reports produced by a 
combination of public and private sector officials similarly endorsed and explored 
macroprudential regulation (G30, 2009, 2010). Naturally as a concept that originated with 
and had been pioneered by BIS staff, BIS staff continued to promote and applaud the new 
emerging Basel consensus in favour of MPR, publishing their own reports and papers, – 
further elaborating the case for MPR (Borio, 2009, Borio, Tasharev and Tsatsronis, 2009,) 
with the BIS even laying claim to be the principal institutional owner and intellectual driver 
of the concept (Clement 2010, Galati and Moessner, 2011).  With so many expert reports 
advocating MPR and macroprudential philosophies, an irresistible momentum in favour of a 
macroprudential approach to regulation was built and diffused throughout the key policy 
locations in the international financial architecture, as a new consensus based on 
macroprudential analytical frame took hold shaping the policy priorities of major central 
banks including the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England 
(Bernanke, 2011, Constancio, 2011, Tucker 2011b).  
        Crucially this increased support for the new consensus came about only because 
macroprudential norm entrepreneurs were willing to be proactive, engaging in a process of 
persuasion, promotion and networking. Entering the fray of crisis diagnosis and response was 
of course not a function of formal duty, or office holding responsibilities for any of the 
individuals mentioned here. Their material interests in pushing MPR in conventional terms 
were also far from clear cut. In the case of each of these individuals there seems to have been 
a genuine intellectual commitment to MPR ideas and analysis and a seeming sense of public 
duty to explain and spread these ideas and proposals
13
. Finnemore and Sikkink identify this 
as ‘ideational commitment’ when norm entrepreneurs promote ideas because they genuinely 
believe in them, even though they have no effect on their own well being (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998, p.898). ‘Ideational commitment’ manifested itself in a genuine desire to 
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persuade others of the correctness or strength of their analysis based on lines of reasoning and 
logical analyses of behaviours and processes. Scoping condition P3 - persuasion and 
promotion, - was therefore an essential component part of the macroprudential ideational 
shift.  
 
P4 =Plausibility and Performance 
Of course such persuasive and promotional strategies were only successful because others 
became more receptive to these arguments. A fourth condition of plausibility and prior 
performance helps to explain why macroprudential arguments became increasingly 
prominent. P4 is plausibility. Plausibility is an undoubted subjective quality and is the result 
of an inherently social process. It is the question of whether the arguments and claims one 
makes are judged to be believable by others. In an institutional context a similar, although not 
identical concept, is the idea of ‘reputational authority’ (Broome and Seabrooke, 2011, 
Sharman, 2007). Plausibility is the outcome of evaluative judgements others make of an 
individual’s prior performance (Brennan and Pettit, 2004). Within the ideational realm it is a 
specific by product of the broader social allocation system that Brennan and Petit refer to as 
the intangible hand of the economy of esteem (Brennan and Petit, 2004). If the esteem an 
individual is allocated by those in their immediate reference group rises due to their prior 
performance and because their track record in advancing analyses and arguments results in 
them being ranked as one of the best performing individuals in the collective judgement of 
others within that reference group, so too will the plausibility and believability of their 
judgements, arguments and prescriptions. Plausibility is therefore directly correlated to social 
status and standing, which is determined by performance and a collective judgement of that 
performance by others. MPR norm entrepreneurs’ high level of performance in making a 
series of prescient calls prior to the crisis led to these individuals enjoying rising levels of 
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professional esteem based on a track record of making the right calls. This had the affect of 
increasing the willingness of politicians and public officials to listen to these arguments, 
leading to a general momentum and consensus in favour of developing macroprudential 
policy. Enhanced esteem and professional standing was also a resource MPR advocates could 
deploy in advancing their persuasive strategies and arguments. William White for example 
became one of the most in demand speakers at central banks throughout the world. 
Macroprudential concepts and proposals therefore emerged as the most intellectually cogent, 
coherent and plausible set of proposals on which the most credible and plausible post crisis 
individuals seemed to have broad base line agreement. Ultimately, in professional 
technocratic ecologies of the sort described in this paper, professional esteem is a key 
currency and it is ideas, analyses and persuasive strategies that provide the route to esteem. 
Esteem and by association, plausibility, is however a social good that has to be continuously 
cultivated and nurtured through performance and therefore it remains to be seen whether 
these gains for the macroprudential perspective are of a short or longer term nature, and this 
will primarily be determined by whether MPR can evolve into a workable and practical 
policy agenda, which enjoys a reasonable level of success.  
        In the context of the four scope conditions identified here macroprudential ideas have 
emerged as the foundational premises shaping many of the key proposals emerging from the 
BCBS, the FSB and central banks. This ‘macroprudential ideational shift’ was the result of an 
‘insiders coup d’etat,’14 which displaced the prior efficient markets orthodox. As a 
consequence, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the EU, the Financial System 
Oversight Council (FSOC) in the US and the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the UK 
have all been established and are to be given some macroprudential responsibilities. The 
Basel III agreement has a macroprudential component involving countercyclical capital 
buffers and the Financial Stability Board has been charged with co-ordinating and reporting 
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on macroprudential policy instruments and reforms. The construction of a macroprudential 
policy regime of sorts is very much underway.  
     
Does the Macroprudential Ideational Shift Really Matter? 
Macroprudential policy is a new ideology and a big idea. That befits what 
is, without question, a big crisis. There are a great many unanswered 
questions before this ideology can be put into practice. These questions will 
shape the intellectual and public policy debate over the next several 
decades, just as the great depression shaped the macroeconomic policy 
debate from the 1940s to the early 1970s (Haldane, 2009, p.1). 
 
As Andrew Haldane’s comments above indicate, macroprudential ideas have become a 
powerful presence in national and international regulatory policy communities. At this point, 
the sceptical reader might be forgiven for asking, does the macroprudential ideational shift 
really matter? Evidence that MPR is making a tangible difference in the financial world 
remains thin. Many large banks and investment firms seem intent on ‘business as usual’. 
However, to dismiss the shift towards MPR in this way would be premature and would miss 
the potential significance of the ideational shift that occurred in the exceptional period of 
crisis politics during 2008-09.   
       The significance and implications of the shift towards MPR become clearer when we 
consider the position of Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for financial stability at the Bank of 
England. For Tucker the move from ‘a default assumption that core markets are more or less 
efficient most of the time’, to, ‘thinking of markets as inefficient, riddled with preferred 
habitats, imperfect arbitrage, herding and inhabited by agents with less than idealized 
rationality’, constitutes a ‘gestalt flip’ (Tucker, 2011, pp.3-4). Thomas Kuhn, of course, 
famously compared the shift from one paradigm to another to a ‘gestalt flip’ (Kuhn, 1996). 
Peter Hall later used this Kuhnian conception to explore the circumstances under which a 
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shift from one policy paradigm to another took place (Hall, 1993). For Hall, a paradigm shift 
was evident when third order change occurred - when there was a radical change in the 
overarching terms of policy discourse, in the hierarchy of goals behind policy and in causal 
assumptions or accounts of how the world facing policy makers actually works. The 
macrprudential shift fits with such a conception of third order change because it has involved 
a widespread movement from assuming financial markets are efficient most of the time, to 
viewing them as characterised by myopia, procyclical patterns and herd behaviour, 
representing a completely different and diametrically opposed set of assumptions about how 
the financial world actually operates. At the same time, the movement from a focus solely on 
the safety and soundness of individual institutions, to viewing risk as a systemic and 
endogenous property that requires a macro regulatory top down focus, represents a 
substantial change in the hierarchy of policy goals. In Hall’s own terms therefore, the 
macroprudential ideational shift represents an example of third order change.  
       However, if sequencing is all important in understanding how ideas and interests 
interrelate and how changing ideas can result in policy and social change, then the 
macroprudential shift also represents a very unusual ordering or sequencing, both in terms of 
the original formulation laid out by Hall, and in subsequent research into how policy 
paradigms evolve and change (Hall, 1993, Oliver and Pemberton, 2004). Hall also 
distinguished between first order change – changes in day to day policy decisions, or 
quantitative adjustments in the setting of policy, and second order changes to the policy 
instruments and institutional settings used to attain third order policy objectives. For Hall a 
paradigm shift was evident when change took place in all three of these components of policy 
simultaneously (Hall, 1993, p.279). In the case of the macroprudential ideational shift a third 
order change in overarching assumptions and policy objectives, has largely preceded the 
development and implementation of second order and first order policy instruments and 
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settings. If all three types of change are required for a paradigm shift therefore, the 
macroprudential shift is best conceived of as an ideational shift, which can only constitute a 
paradigm shift once first and second order macroprudential policies have actually been 
developed, implemented and become operational.  
          The scholarly importance of the macroprudential ideational shift becomes clearer when 
we revisit Hall’s classic account of the shift in British macroeconomic from Keynesian to 
Monetarism. In this case, the progressive accumulation of anomalies in the existing 
Keynesian paradigm, resulted in various forms of experimentation with first and second order 
monetarist style policy changes before a third order change in overarching policy objectives 
eventually transpired. The basic formulation in this case was 1+2 = 3, (eventually). In an 
interesting reversal of the sequencing of the paradigm shift in British macroeconomic policy 
in the 1970s, the macroprudential shift has constituted a shift straight to 3, by passing 1+2. 
During 2009, the insiders coup d’etat outlined in the previous section, resulted in a form of 
third order change before second and first order policies had been fully worked out. This 
would, suggest that the macroprudential ideational shift is different from the case considered 
by Hall and the process of paradigm evolution identified by Oliver and Pemberton (Oliver 
and Pemberton, 2004). The efficient markets orthodoxy may well have been progressively 
accumulating anomalies during the period 2003-2008, but they were not perceived as such by 
a dominant coalition of actors in the regulatory policy community and consequently there 
was no period of experimentation with first and second order policy from outside of the 
efficient markets paradigm. Instead as the dramatic events of 2008 appeared to render many 
of the assumptions and analytical claims of the efficient markets perspective obsolete, MPR 
advocates moved swiftly and opportunistically to fill the resulting ideational vacuum. In this 
respect, financial crises are defined not just by material happenings but also by what happens 
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to the claims and ideas that justified prior practice and whether new ideas emerge which give 
rise to alternative realities and constitute a critical turning point (Hay, 2011, Gamble, 2009).  
        In relation to MPR, only now is a process of experimentation with first and second order 
policy development beginning (see figure 2). As voices at the Bank of England have pointed 
out, ‘the state of macroprudential policy resembles the state of monetary policy just after the 
second world war, with patchy data, incomplete theory and negligible experience, meaning 
that MPR will be conducted by trial and error’ (Aikman, Haldane, and Nelson, 2011). Hence 
we have entered a fourth phase of policy experimentation in the development of MPR  (see 
figure 2).  In this case 3 might eventually = 2+1. This makes the macroprudential ideational 
shift an interesting test case for evaluating whether successful paradigm shifts always follow 
the 1+2=3 sequence identified by Hall, or whether it is possible for them to be sustained on 
the basis of a 3=2+1 sequence, without prior first and second order policy experimentation.  
         Another difference to the case considered by Hall is that the macroprudential shift has 
involved a third order shift primarily instigated by insider elites and technocrats, while third 
order change in Hall’s case of British macroeconomic policy was promoted by politicians and 
societal actors such as the media and think tanks. The very nature of the macroprudential shift 
poses the question of whether technocratic elites can successfully instigate and crucially 
sustain a third order change, or whether successful durable third order change has to emanate 
from wider societal and political actors. The relative failure of macroprudential norm 
entrepreneurs to engage mass publics and build a wider popular support base to enhance the 
political legitimacy of macroprudential ideas, may yet prove to be the Achilles heel of 
macroprudential norm entrepreneurs’ persuasive strategies (Widimaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 
2007, Thirkell-White, 2009). However, the different source of third order change also reflects 
the differing political dynamics of macroeconomic policy and financial regulatory policy. 
Macroeconomic policy is always a central plank of any aspiring political party’s programme 
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to govern and a key part of its communications with the electorate. Financial regulation, 
although important is less central to political manifestoes, and the understanding of 
politicians and the public is often more reliant on technocrats. Changes in the regulatory 
domain, often little noticed, have in the past led to change in the macroeconomic domain. 
Notably the macroeconomic shift in the UK referred to by Hall, was preceded by and partly a 
function of changes in the financial system such as the decision to allow the euro markets 
flourish and liberalisation of debt and credit markets (Baker, 1999).  
            In policy terms, this third order ideational shift matters for two reasons. First, it has 
switched the principal cognitive filter employed by policy makers to an entirely different 
setting. The effect of this is to burst the hermetically sealed efficient markets bubble most 
financial regulators resided in prior to the crisis. Policy makers are now using various 
combinations of the four key constituent concepts of fallacy of composition, procyclicality, 
herding, and complex externalities to inform and guide regulatory initiatives and practice. 
Because the cognitive filter employed by regulators has been switched to a different setting, a 
whole range of proposals can now be placed on the table and seriously discussed, which were 
previously out of reach. These include countercyclical capital requirements; dynamic loan 
loss provisioning, countercyclical liquidity requirements; administrative caps on aggregate 
lending; reserve requirements; limits on leverage in asset purchases; loan to value ratios for 
mortgages; loan to income ratios; minimum margins on secured lending; transaction taxes; 
constraints on currency mismatches; capital controls; and host country regulation (Elliot, 
2011). Indeed, Brazil has recently used macroprudential reasoning to justify the use of capital 
controls (Banco Central da Brasil, 2010,) much to the disapproval of macroprudential 
advocates (Borio, 2011, FSB, IMF, BIS 2011), illustrating the extent to which the 
macroprudential frame remains a highly contested and contingent one. Nevertheless, the 
conceptual foundations of MPR have taken hold in the regulatory community with the result 
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that regulatory debates have taken a qualitatively different form, in a fashion which should 
empower regulators and reduce the capacity of private actors to drive the regulatory debate in 
the fashion witnessed during the period in which the efficient markets position was ascendant 
(Johnson and Kwak, 2010, Baker, 2010, Tsingou, 2008). Crucial here is the argument that no 
model of political economy and no government can afford to sustain the costs, in terms of 
lost macroeconomic output generated by huge financial explosions such as the one seen in 
2008 (Alessandri and Haldane, 2009). Second, many of these macroprudential instruments 
are designed to reduce the scale and restrict the scope of financial transacting (Turner, 2011). 
This at least is suggestive of lower levels of financialisation, which may require Anglo-
American societies in particular to engage in some reformulation of their growth models and 
social settlements, although that is a long term enterprise. In the words of Paul Tucker 
therefore, what appear to be quite technical things may have significant effects on the 
behaviour and structure of the financial system over time (Tucker, 2011, p.7.) 
         Opposition to this macroprudential third order ideational shift has been surprisingly 
muted even from the private sector. Only recently, has the IIF made a generally encouraging 
and supportive submission to international authorities on the subject of MPR (IIF, 2011). One 
possible reason for this relative lack of action is that few in the private sector have 
understood, or been aware of the potential significance of the macroprudential ideational 
shift. Another possibility is that banks have calculated that macroprudential policies could 
improve their long term stability and appease public anger at their behaviour. Further 
empirical research into private sector preferences and strategies in relation to macroprudential 
policy will be important in advancing our understanding of the new political economy of 
MPR. A distinct probability is that private sector lobbies will focus their energies on 
influencing the first and second order macroprudential policies that will have most impact on 
their day to day activities. Evidence from the Basel III process suggests that such a pattern 
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was evident in the negotiation of that agreement as many regulators remain unhappy that 
capital equity ratios were not set high enough, following some private sector pressure 
(Turner, 2011, Miles et al, 2010). The relative lack of concerted private sector opposition in 
principle to the macroprudential agenda may also be explained by the countercyclical nature 
of much macroprudential policy. During a period of financial deleveraging, countercyclical 
macroprudential policies place little burden on private actors. Private opposition is likely to 
intensify during a growth or boom phase when counter cyclical capital requirements become 
more onerous. Moreover, the relative novelty both of macroprudential ideas and policy 
instruments mean that there is also likely to be a process of ‘puzzling’ taking place amongst 
private sector lobbies as they figure out what their material interests are in relation to 
macroprudential policies, and of course macroprudential ideas will not be static but will 
continue to evolve incrementally as we enter a phase of policy experimentation (Carstenen, 
2011, Figure 2).   
       Nevertheless, after an exceptional phase of crisis politics when prior orthodoxies were 
overturned and displaced, a more normal phase of conventional interest based politics and 
contests between regulators and regulated can be expected to emerge over the coming years, 
as contests over the detail over the content and institutional design of macroprudential 
regulatory regimes are fought out. Quite surprisingly and counter intuitively supposedly 
conservative regulators have emerged at the vanguard of efforts to progressively transform 
the financial system, in ways which have reconfigured the politics and political alignments of 
financial regulation in surprising ways, largely due to their adoption of the macroprudential 
frame.   As the Brazilian case illustrates, states will no doubt disagree over the interpretation 
of macroprudential ideas and what counts as macroprudential and what does not, while also 
seeking to gain competitive advantage for their own financial sectors (Mugge and Stellinga, 
2010). Politicians are likely to come under pressure from private interests to constrain the 
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regulators in their application of macroprudential philosophies and policies. In the UK for 
example, the Treasury select committee is already seeking to constrain the powers and 
autonomy of the FPC to exercise macroprudential discretion (Masters and Giles, 2011). 
Worries that the macroprudential agenda is ‘still born’ persist because a new regulatory 
architecture has still not taken route (Blyth, 2011), and regulators, as evident in the VaR 
component of Basel III, continue to write rules for risk based world, rather than an uncertain 
one (Blyth, 2011, Lanoo, 2011 see endnote 8). These difficulties are compounded by the 
sequencing issue outlined above and the question of whether 3 can ever = 2+1. Furthermore, 
as Adair Turner explains, ‘in an ideal world, we would choose not to start from here,’ – ‘a 
starting point of sub optimally high leverage, which unless managed carefully will slow 
recovery from crisis induced recession’ (Turner, 2011), a process which might be exacerbated 
by the turn to austerity policies, thus derailing the macroprudential shift (Blyth, 2011).  
        This last point reflects the fact that the macroprudential agenda’s great economic 
strength is also its great political weakness. Countercyclicality is politically treacherous. In an 
economic downturn, immediately following a crisis, when the political will for more 
regulation is precisely at its greatest, the macroprudential perspective advocates a more 
generous approach to regulatory and capital requirements, but then favours tightening these 
requirements during a growth phase, precisely when the political appetite for such 
requirements may have dissipated, as the memory of the crisis has faded. This leaves 
macroprudential regulators with a tricky political condundrum to solve, - the question of how 
to arm themselves with sufficient institutional autonomy, policy capability and discretion to 
neutralise procyclical political pressures. Answers to this question will materialise from the 
interaction of policy makers ongoing learning in an era of macroprudential experimentation 
and the institutional mediation of interest based politics, as phases 4 and 5 in figure 2 merge 
into one another. Nevertheless, whether 3 can ever = and lead to 2+1, will be an intriguing 
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laboratory and test case for scholars of ideational politics and sequencing over the coming 
years.   
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
          
Conclusions 
After providing a brief history and genealogy of macroprudential ideas, outlining four 
constituent concepts of fallacy of composition, procyclicality, herding and complexity, this 
article moved on to explain why these ideas surged in popularity once the financial crisis 
reached its peak in the autumn of 2008. The explanation identified four conditions of prior 
intellectual and institutional presence (presence = P1), the improved professional position of 
macroprudential advocates (position = P2), the promotional, persuasive and networking 
strategies of a small number of norm entrepreneurs (promotion = P3), and the growing 
plausibility of these ideas as devices for navigating and responding to the financial crisis, 
based on the rising professional standing and esteem of the individuals advocating these ideas 
due to their prior performance (plausibility= P4). These norm entrepreneurs operated within 
linked professional ecologies, to affect an insider’s coup d’etat, piloting their ideas to the 
centre of the policy agenda. Once the crisis reached its peak, the prevailing context of these 
professional ecologies became a great deal more sympathetic to the arguments of MPR norm 
entrepreneurs, enabling them to institutionalise their ideas and concepts as the principal 
interpretative frame for diagnosing and responding to the crisis in key technocratic regulatory 
networks such as the FSB, the BCBS and a number of leading central banks. Surprisingly, the 
concept of an economy of esteem (Brennan and Pettit, 2004), which, it has been suggested in 
this article, shapes plausibility, has been neglected in constructivist political economy, despite 
the fact it complements this approach, by highlighting crucial determinants of the success or 
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failure of their ideas
15
. In future research, constructivism might be well served by engaging 
with the concept of an economy of esteem, so as to more fully understand the social 
processes that determine why individuals promote certain ideas and how certain ideas enjoy 
success over others.  
        The final section of the paper enquired whether the macroprudential ideational shift 
really matters given a pattern of business as usual in the financial world. Dismissing the shift 
to MPR is not only premature given the protracted task of constructing it on its own 
countercyclical terms, it also misses the point that MPR represents a ‘gestalt flip’ that 
earmarks a potential trajectory change in financial regulation that is still in its infancy and so 
does not as yet look conspicuously different from the previous status quo. This ‘gestalt flip,’ 
it has been argued, is equivalent to Peter Hall’s notion of third order change in the 
overarching assumptions and goals informing policy. Unusually, this third change not only 
occurred very suddenly through an insiders coup d’etat, it was also not preceded by processes 
of first and second order policy experimentation, which in the past have either resulted in the 
evolution or consolidation of the existing paradigm, or an eventual paradigm shift in a 1+2=3 
formulation (Hall, 1993, Oliver and Pemberton, 2004). Whether a reversed 3 = 2+1 sequence 
can materialise in this case will be an interesting test case for scholars of ideational politics. 
What is clear is that the macroprudential agenda has to overcome considerable procyclical 
political obstacles, and it will continue to co-exist with some of the old risk management 
practices
16
. Finally, technocratic regulators rather than wider publics and societal actors have 
been the drivers behind this third order ideational shift. The result is that regulators and 
central banks are the current driving forces behind a potentially progressive transformation of 
the financial system by stealth, in a fashion that few would have considered likely a few years 
ago. This has had the affect of reconfiguring the political dynamics and coalitions in the 
regulatory arena, as regulators seek to carve out regulatory and policy space for themselves to 
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implement macroprudential philosophies, often in the face of political and industry 
opposition. How these coalitions interact and how the arguments they use develop over the 
coming years will shape the course and development of macroprudential regulation both 
internationally and nationally.  
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gratitude to Ole Jacob Sending, Wes Widmaier, Mark Blyth, Len Seabrooke, Abe Newman, Eleni Tsingou, Eric 
Helleiner, Steve Nelson, Ove Pedersen, John Campbell, Andre Broome, Kevin Young, Manuella Moschella, 
Duncan Wigan, Robert Boyer and James Perry, for some very helpful discussions and comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper, as well as the useful guidance and comments of three anonymous NPE reviewers. 
Remaining shortcomings are my responsibility alone. 
2
 For example Helleiner’s account of Bretton Woods identifies four phases beginning in the early 1930s  moving 
through to a consolidation phase in the 1950s. Likewise Blyth’s account of the rise of embedded liberalism in 
the US begins with the election of Roosevalt in 1932 and carries through to the enactment of  key legislation in 
1947. 
3
 Macroprudential issues did get discussed in BIS documents in the 1990s BIS (1995, 1997). The IMF also 
attempted to develop some macroprudential indicators after the Asian financial crisis as part of revamping of 
surveillance (IMF, 2000, 2001, Moschella, 2011). 
4
 Note that microprudential is not an antonym of macroprudential. A microprudential approach can be a 
constitutent part of a macroprudential approach.  
5
 Former Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince captured the essence of this in an interview in the Financial Times in 
July 2007, when he said, “when the music is playing you have to get up and dance.”  The down part of the cycle 
is captured by Warren Buffet’s phrase that it is only when the tide goes out that you see who has been 
swimming naked. 
6
 Counter cyclical capital buffers are often confused with the so called capital adequacy regime, or the 
regulatory capital institutions are required to hold to operate in the market. That capital is a charge not a buffer, 
because it cannot used by an institution to tide it over in bad times (Eatwell, 2009 ) Capital adequacy standards, 
in other words, are not counter cyclical. The Spanish system of dynamic provisioning is frequently cited by 
macroprudential advocates as an example of how such a system of countercyclicality might operate. 
7
 William White formerly of the BIS has made the claim regarding Austrian school influences, but these 
intellectual influences are much less clearly identifiable than Minskyian ones. Essentially the Austrian school 
label refers to White’s belief that public authorities often preside over and contribute to credit bubbles through 
an overly easy monetary policy stance. 
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The Macroprudential policy programme is still evolving through a process of trial, error and experimentation as 
will be discussed in the final section of the paper. Microprudential approaches are not discontinued as a 
consequence of the macroprudential ideational shift, rather it is their adequacy that is disputed by the 
macroprudential case and so macroprudential approaches overlay, rather than replace Microprudential 
approaches altogether.  
9
 Of course this is one of the many instances where the distinction between ideas and interests becomes blurred. 
National regulators for example might have recognised that MPR provided a route to equip them with more 
powers to police the market, opportunistically taking advantage of the fact market actors were on the back foot. 
While market actors may have calculated that macroprudential proposals constituted a least worst scenario, as 
populist anti bank sentiment surged and that such proposals even offered the opportunity to protect the industry 
from its own excesses. Further research is required to verify either of these hypotheses. 
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